SEC 每年巨额罚没收入都去了哪？投资者抱怨SEC还钱太慢
SEC 每年巨额罚没收入都去了哪？
投资者抱怨SEC还钱太慢
继民财经汇导读: 这些年，SEC 通过对资本市场被监管方的处罚，收了不少钱，我们不妨先看一下以下来自ＳＥＣ年报的信息：
l 2011年SEC共处理735起执法案件(enforcement actions)，没收或者罚金总金额28亿美元；
l 2012年SEC共处理734起执法案件，没收或者罚金总金额31亿美元；
l 2013年SEC共处理686起执法案件，没收或者罚金总金额34亿美元；
l 2014年SEC共处理755起执法案件，共没收或者罚款金额41.6亿美元（有几个历史案件在庭审中获胜）；
l 2015年SEC共处理807起执法案件，共没收或者罚款金额42亿美元；
l 2016年SEC共处理868起执法案件，共没收或者罚款金额超过40亿美元。
不过这些罚没收入并不是作为联邦的财政收入或者SEC的自己小金库；在安然事件之后，美国的萨班斯法案授权SEC将罚没收入建立为公平基金(fair fund), 用以返还给受损失的投资者；所以，以上罚没金额大部分是作为返还投资者损失的补偿。能为投资者挽回多少损失，这是ＳＥＣ对资本市场进行事后监管的重要内容和尽职能力考核指标（KPI ）之一。 在2007年开始的金融危机系列诉讼案件中， 由SEC 和其他监管机构共同发起的对银行诉讼所追回的罚款等金额总共超过400亿美元，这远远要高于股东集体诉讼中所获得的赔偿。
有媒体文章披露，这些年， 在SEC 激进的执法活动中，已经有超过数百亿甚至上千亿美元的款项得到返还给遭受损失的投资者“Hundreds of billions of dollars were returned to harmed investors as a result of our aggressive enforcement program.”
然而，SEC 的公平基金在投资者损失实际返还并不总是有效率，这个过程往往十分长久。据SEC 披露，大部分的款项可以在返还方案经过批准后两年之年支付到投资者手中；然而， 从SEC 实际收到罚没收入，到这些罚没收入支付计划得到批准，这个过程所耗费的时间很长，有的甚至长达8年之久；如果再考虑到上市公司欺诈行为实际发生时间，那么，这个过程就更加漫长了。
以下一文章就是报道在花旗银行次级债案件中， SEC在2015年 处罚了花旗银行1.8亿美元；然而，至今已经是500多天了， 投资者至今没有收到赔偿款项；如果从次级债丑闻爆发算起，那么更是有8年之久了。投资者认为，在赔偿款项支付的效率上，对SEC 的问责并不到位。“The bottom line is, there’s no accountability.”
而SEC 则认为，投资者需要耐心，耐心，因为赔偿款项的支付过程确实十分复杂。
以上是继民财经汇导读，接下来是歌曲欣赏和自由阅读时间，请君随意......
S.E.C. Inertia on Paybacks Adds to Investor Harm
Fair Game （来自纽约时报）
GRETCHEN MORGENSON
When securities laws are broken and investors get hurt, the Securities and Exchange Commission often rides to the rescue, using its regulatory muscle to extract penalties that can be returned to victims.
But as a cadre of harmed Citigroup investors is learning, it is one thing to persuade a wrongdoer to pay reparations and quite another to disburse the money.
This particular matter dates to August 2015, when the S.E.C. struck a settlement with Citigroup over an exotic investment strategy involving municipal bonds that the bank sold to clients from 2002 to 2008.
Contending that Citigroup had misrepresented the investments’ risks, the S.E.C. ordered the creation of a so-called fair fund to be distributed to investors. Citigroup neither admitted nor denied the allegations but agreed to pay $180 million into the fund.
That was over 16 months ago. Today, the wronged investors are not only still awaiting their money, but they have yet to see any plan outlining how the $180 million will be distributed, the S.E.C.’s website shows.
Receiving reparations in cases like these is a multistep process that the S.E.C. details on the site. Typically, restitution funds sit in an account at the United States Treasury. Disbursement is generally overseen by outside entities appointed by the S.E.C.; their fees are paid by the institution providing the funds.
Fair funds were established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; they allow the S.E.C. to exact civil penalties in addition to recovering ill-gotten gains, a process known as disgorgement.
The S.E.C. website shows that the Citigroup case is one of roughly 80 fair fund and disgorgement plans currently operating. Another 60 or so plans have been terminated; this means they have finished distributing the money to investors. Any amounts left over go to the Treasury or an S.E.C. investor protection fund.
Patience is required of those going through the process, the S.E.C. warns. “The process for distributing the money to harmed investors may take a long time,” it noted on its site.
But the pace of the Citigroup restitution plan seems especially glacial. And it raises questions about how these plans are administered and whether those overseeing them are rewarded for slowing down the process.
At the time of the settlement, the S.E.C. said a plan of distribution to harmed investors would be submitted “within 120 days of payment in full” by Citigroup. That payment was made in August 2015, a bank spokeswoman said.
And yet, 500 days later, there’s still no plan of distribution.
I asked the S.E.C. what was causing the holdup. Judith Burns, a spokeswoman, declined to comment.
Keep in mind: It has been almost nine years since the Citigroup investors incurred their losses when the municipal bond strategy collapsed in 2008. Advertised as a safe-money bet to some 4,000 clients who invested $3 billion, the strategy wound up losing between one-half and three-quarters of some customers’ account values. Seven years later came the settlement and the S.E.C. order to create the $180 million fund.
Lawyers for the aggrieved investors say they are losing patience. “To me, it comes down to a bureaucratic quagmire of indifference and concealment,” said Steven B. Caruso, a lawyer at Maddox Hargett & Caruso in New York City. “There is simply no transparency in this process, and no effort being made by the S.E.C. to recognize that these are funds that belong to other people.”
Because many of the investors are subject to confidentiality agreements, they were wary about discussing their concerns.
A bit of activity occurred in the case last April, when the S.E.C. said it had appointed a plan administrator for the fund. It was Garden City Group, a provider of legal administrative services that is a unit of Atlanta-based Crawford & Company.
Then more silence.
Of course, it isn’t simple returning money to wronged investors. Determining who deserves how much of a settlement’s proceeds, and locating those people, is complicated. Needless to say, recovering some losses, even if it’s pennies on the dollar and many years later, is better than never receiving a thing.
But the S.E.C. trumpets its role in getting money back to harmed investors. In its most recent annual report, for example, the agency said, “Hundreds of billions of dollars were returned to harmed investors as a result of our aggressive enforcement program.”
A review of the S.E.C. website shows that the timelines for these fund distributions can be long indeed. For example, in 2007, the S.E.C. settled an enforcement case with a mutual fund company and ordered the creation of a $40 million fund approved for distribution to wronged investors. That fund was approved in July 2015; the improprieties at the mutual fund company had occurred from September 2001 to October 2003, the S.E.C. said.
Even relatively simple cases seem to be a slog. Consider a municipal bond, pay-to-play case involving J.P. Morgan Securities and Jefferson County, Ala. In early November 2009, the bank settled with the S.E.C., without admitting or denying the allegations, and paid a $25 million penalty. A fair fund was set up to dispense the money to the county; the plan was approved in early October 2010 and disbursements went out in February 2011.
Even though the case involved just one recipient, it took 15 months from start to finish.
I asked the S.E.C. how long each fair fund process takes, and got a partial answer.
In fiscal 2015, the most recent data available, the agency said 96 percent of fair funds and disgorgement plans had distributed 80 percent of their money within two years of a plan’s approval. That was a significant improvement over the previous year, when only 80 percent of funds had done so.
But these figures don’t take into account the time between an S.E.C. settlement and a plan’s approval, which can be many years. In the $40 million mutual fund case dating to 2001, for example, it took eight years for the fund to be approved.
Mr. Caruso said he had tried repeatedly to get answers about what was happening with the fund. At first, the S.E.C. told him it was waiting to get the list of investors from Citigroup. Then, an agency official suggested he try Garden City Group, which he did.
“Every time I would call, somebody else would call me back to say, ‘We really don’t have a timetable, and we don’t have a lot of information,’” Mr. Caruso recalled.
I asked Stephen Cirami, chief operating officer of Garden City Group, about the status of the fund. He did not return my voice mail message or email.
I had hoped to learn how Garden City Group gets paid for its services. For example, is it incentivized to move quickly in distributing the funds, or is it paid more the longer the process takes?
It is Citigroup, not the investors, paying these costs. But an inefficient process means investors are hurt twice.
“That $180 million should be back in people’s pockets, not sitting in some account somewhere,” Mr. Caruso said. “The bottom line is, there’s no accountability.”